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ABSTRACT Over the last few years, identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) has attracted widespread attention
because it avoids the high overheads associated with public key certificate management. However, an
unsolved but critical issue about IBC is how to revoke a misbehaving user. There are some revocable identity-
based encryption schemes that have been proposed recently, but little work on the revocation problem of
identity-based signature has been undertaken so far. One approach for revocation in identity-based settings is
to update users’ private keys periodically, which is usually done by the key generation center (KGC). But with
this approach, the load on theKGCwill increase quicklywhen the number of users increases. In this paper, we
propose an efficient revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) scheme in which the revocation functionality
is outsourced to a cloud revocation server (CRS). In our proposed approach, most of the computations needed
during key-updates are offloaded to the CRS. We describe the new framework and the security model for
the RIBS scheme with CRS and we prove that the proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against
adaptively chosen messages and identity attacks in the random oracle model. Furthermore, we monstrate that
our scheme outperforms previous IBS schemes in terms of lower computation and communication costs.
INDEX TERMS Identity-based signature, revocation, cloud computing, outsourcing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a critical feature of public key cryptogra-
phy that provides user identification, authentication and non-
repudiation. In traditional public key infrastructure (PKI),
users’ public keys used to verify signatures are bound with
their certificates. Certificate authorities (CAs) are responsible
for issuing, maintaining and revoking certificates. In identity-
based cryptosystems, however, a user’s identity information
is the public key. It is a challenge to verify if a user has been
revoked or not. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [1] suggested
that the key generator center (KGC) updates secret keys for
all non-revoked users periodically. The idea was adopted by
many identity-based encryption schemes to realize revocation
functionality. Unfortunately, there are two drawbacks with
their proposals. First, theKGCmust kept online, which brings
out some security threats. Second, the overhead at the KGC
will dramatically increase as the number of users increases.
With the rapid development of cloud computing, many
organizations tend to outsource computation tasks to some
powerful cloud based server. In fact, it is not rare in the
history of cryptography to outsource heavy computation tasks
to a third party. Quite recently Li et al. [2] introduced an
approach to outsource the key-updating tasks to a Key Update
Cloud Server Provider (KU-CSP) and proposed an efficient
revocable identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. We adopt
their approach and apply it to identity-based signature (IBS)
settings. A trivial idea is to offload all key-updating tasks to
the cloud server. However, there are some security issues we
must take into account: the cloud server is not always trusted.
So we split the signing key of a user into an initial identity key
and a time update key. The former is a long-term key bound
to the user’s identity and issued by the KGC, and the latter
is a short-term key related not only to the user’s identity, but
also to the current time period. The time update key is issued
and updated by a cloud revocation server (CRS) periodically.
The CRS cannot forge a signature because it does not hold
the complete signing key. To revoke users, the KGC simply
notifies the cloud server to stop issuing new time update keys
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for them.With this technique, many existing IBS schemes can
be improved to be revocable.
A. RELATED WORK
We discuss a few recently proposed IBS schemes
below.
Shamir first introduced the idea of identity-based cryp-
tosystem (IBC) [3], after that Fiat and Shamir [4] presented a
construction of IBS scheme based on the factoring problem.
Since then, several other proposals based on factoring have
been developed [5]–[7].
The first fully practical implementation of identity-based
setting emerged in 2001, when Boneh and Franklin [1] pro-
posed an IBE scheme using Weil pairing on elliptic curves.
Since then many solutions for IBS schemes with bilinear
pairings have been proposed. Sakai et al. [8] presented an IBS
scheme based on bilinear pairings but no security analysis
was given. Choon and Cheon [9] proposed an IBS scheme
by utilizing gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups.
Paterson [10] presented another efficient IBS scheme and
reduced the security of their scheme to a non-IBS scheme.
Hess [11], [12] developed an efficient IBS scheme and
extended it to a generic framework, from which several
variations can be exported (include ElGamal variations and
Schnorr version).The author also considered the key escrow
by extending the system to multiple trust authorities. Galindo
and Garcia [13] also proposed a Schnorr-like lightweight IBS
scheme without pairings. Bellare et al. [14] provided a frame-
work for security proof of IBS schemes. Zhang et al. [15]
proposed an efficient IBS scheme secure under the k-CAA
assumption. Barreto et al. [16] presented an identity-based
signcryption (IBSC) scheme with bilinear pairings. Based on
Water’s IBE scheme [17], Paterson and Schuldt [18] pre-
sented an efficient IBS scheme and proved its security in
the standard model. In recent years, many IBS schemes such
as those based on ring signatures, blind signatures, proxy
signatures, group signatures etc. were proposed [19]–[22].
There are several efficient proposals of IBS schemes
with or without bilinear pairings which have been proposed.
However, only a few of them discussed the revocation of
misbehaving users. Boneh and Franklin [1] developed a gen-
eral approach to implement the revocation functionality in
identity-based cryptosystems. That is, the KGC generates
new secret keys for each non-revoked user periodically, and
it simply stops to issue new private keys for the revoked
users. Based on this idea, various revocable IBE schemes
were proposed [23]–[27] in the past.
The first revocable IBS scheme was proposed by
Tsai et al. [28], which adopted the revocation technique
employed in [27]. The authors proved the security of their
scheme in the standard model. Based on their scheme,
Hung et al. [29] proposed another RIBS scheme with
improved security. Sun et al. [30] presented an efficient RIBS
scheme without pairing but no security proof was given.
Recently, Wei et al. [31] proposed a forward secure RIBS
scheme employing the complete subtree (CS) method where
the KGC must maintain a binary tree on which each node
represents a user.
In the above RIBS schemes [28]–[31], the KGC is respon-
sible not only for issuing the initial identity key for each
registered user, but also for renewing the time update keys for
non-revoked users periodically, which brings two drawbacks.
First, the KGC needs to be kept online which is not secure.
Second, with the increasing in the number of system users,
the computation and communication overheads at the KGC
also increase quickly. In this case, the KGC will become the
security and performance bottleneck of the whole cyrptosys-
tem.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we propose the first RIBS scheme with a cloud
revocation server. We describe the framework of a RIBS
schemewith outsourced revocation and formalize the security
model. Then we describe our proposed scheme in detail and
analyze its security. We prove that our scheme is existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity
attacks in the random oracle model. Neither a revoked user
nor a curious cloud server can forge a valid signature even
if they collude with other non-revoked users in the system.
We also provide a performance evaluation of our scheme and
we compare its performance with other IBS schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
preliminary works in Section II. Section III describes the
framework of a RIBS scheme with outsourced cloud revo-
cation server and formalizes its security model. Section IV
describes our proposed RIBS scheme in detail. We present
the security analysis of our scheme in Section V. Section VI
presents the performance evaluation results of our scheme.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURE
A typical IBS scheme involves three parties: the KGC, the
signer and the verifier. There are four algorithms in an IBS
scheme defined as follows.
• Setup: (MSK ,PP)← Setup(λ). KGC takes as input the
security parameter λ, and outputs the master system key
MSK and system public parameters PP including the
system public key Ppub .
• Initial Key Extraction: SID ← KeyExt(MSK , ID).
KGC generates a private key for each user. It takes as
input MSK and a user’s identity ID, and returns the
private key SID.
• Signing: σ ← Sign(m, SID,PP). The signer takes as
input his/her private key SID, the message m and the
public parameters, and outputs a signature σ .
• Verification: Accept/Reject ← Ver(σ, ID,m,PP). The
verifier takes as input the signature σ , the identity ID
of the signer, the message m and PP , and returns an
‘‘Accept’’ or a ‘‘Reject’’ to demonstrate if the signature
is valid or not.
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The consistency of an IBS scheme requires that for any SID
generated by algorithm KeyExt when given ID as input, and
for any σ = Sign(m, SID,PP),Ver(σ, ID,m,PP) = "Accept"
holds.
B. BILINEAR PAIRINGS AND COMPUTATIONAL
ASSUMPTIONS
LetG be an additive cyclic group, whose order is a large prime
q. P is a generator of G. GT is a multiplicative cyclic group
of the same order q. The map eˆ : G× G→ GT is said to be
an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies:
• Bilinearity: For all P,Q ∈ G, x, y ∈ Z∗q , there is
eˆ(xP, yQ) = eˆ(P,Q)xy;
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G such that
eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1GT ;
• Computability: For any element P,Q ∈ G, there is an
polynomial time algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) ∈ GT .
Next we present the mathematical assumption used in our
scheme.
Computational Diffie-Hellam Problem (CDH): Given a
triple (P, aP, bP) for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , we compute
abP.
The CDH assumption says that there is no polynomial
time algorithm which can solve the CDH problem with non-
negligible probability.
III. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we describe the system framework of an
outsourced RIBS scheme and its security model.
A. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
A RIBS scheme involves three parties: the KGC, the CRS
and users (signers and verifiers). At the beginning of the
system initialization, the KGC generates and publishes some
common parameters and sends a secret master time key to
the CRS. Then the KGC issues the initial identity key for
each user with its master system key when the user is reg-
istered. The CRS issues and updates the users’ time update
keys according to the revocation user list received from the
KGC. If a user is in the revocation user list, then the CRS
refuses to update the time update key for the user. We present
the framework of our system in Fig. 1. Table 1 shows the
notations used in the proposed RIBS scheme.
There are five algorithms in a RIBS scheme: system ini-
tialization algorithm (Setup), initial key extraction algorithm
(InitKeyExt), time key updating algorithm (TimeKeyUpd),
signing algorithm (Sign), verification algorithm (Ver). The
KGC maintains a revocation list (RL) which contains the
identities of revoked users and the RL is updated periodically.
• Setup(1λ) : The KGC takes a security parameter λ and
outputs a master system keymsk , a master time keymtk ,
a time period list T = (T0,T1, . . .) and system public
parameters PP. KGC keepsmsk for itself, and sendsmtk
to the CRS securely. PP is published to all users in the
system.
FIGURE 1. Identity-based signature with (cloud) outsourced revocation.
TABLE 1. Summary of notations.
• InitKeyExt(PP,msk, ID) : On receiving a register
request from the user with identity ID, the KGC runs
this algorithm to issue a secret identity key DID with the
input PP, msk , a user’s identity ID, and sends DID to the
user securely.
• TimeKeyUpd(PP,mtk, ID,Ti) : On receiving an update
request from a user, the CRS first checks if the user is
in the RL. If it is, the CRS rejects the update request.
If not, the CRS runs the algorithm and generates a new
time key TKID,Ti for the user with the input PP, mtk , the
user’s identity ID and current time period Ti.
A user’s signing key SID,Ti consists of two parts: SID,Ti =
(DID,TKID,Ti ).
• Sign(PP,m, ID,Ti, SID,Ti ) : To sign a message m, the
signer runs this algorithm with input PP, m, his own
identity ID, current time period Ti and SID,Ti , and outputs
the signature σ .
• Ver(PP,m, σ, ID,Ti) : To verify a signature σ on mes-
sage m with the signer’s identity ID and time period Ti,
the verifier runs the algorithm with PP, m, σ , ID and Ti,
and outputs an ‘‘Accept’’ or ‘‘Reject’’ according to the
validity of the signature.
The consistency criterion states that for
any message m, any identity ID and any
time period Ti, if σ = Sign(PP,m, ID,Ti, SID,Ti ), where
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SID,Ti = (InitKeyExt(msk, ID),TimeKeyUpd(mtk, ID,Ti)),
then we have Ver(PP,m, σ, ID,Ti) = ‘‘Accept ′′ with a high
probability.
B. SECURITY MODEL
Bellare et al. [14] first formalized the security of an
IBS scheme in 2004, namely, security against existen-
tial forgery on adaptively chosen message and identity
attacks (EUF-CMA). Based on this formalization, we first
consider the following two types of adversaries.
• Type I adversary AI . AI is a revoked user. SupposeAI has
identity ID and was revoked at time period Ti. AI intends
to produce valid signatures after time period Ti. AI still
owns the initial identity key DID, and we assume that AI
can collude with other legal users to obtain their identity
keys and time update keys at arbitrary time periods.
AI cannot know is its own time update keys after time
period Ti.
• Type II adversary AII . Type II adversary can be seen as a
curious CRS who tries to create a valid signature in the
name of a system user. Since the CRS holds the master
time key, so it can obtain the time update key of any user
at any time. We also assume that AII can collude with
other users to obtain their identity keys. In this case, the
adversary cannot know the target user’s identity keyDID.
We define the security model of an outsourced RIBS
scheme through the following two games between a chal-
lenger and one of the above two types of adversaries. The
game between AI and a challenger SI is defined below.
Game 1:
• Setup. SI runs the Setup algorithm with input security
parameter λ, and outputs msk , mtk and PP as defined
in the system framework. SI keeps msk,mtk secret and
sends PP to AI .
• Query. AI makes a series of queries to SI adaptively, and
SI responds to each type of queries in the following way.
- Initial key extract query (ID). AI issues this query
to get the initial key of some user with iden-
tity ID. SI runs InitKeyExt algorithm with input
(PP,msk, ID), and returns the resulting DID to AI .
- Time key update query (ID,Ti). AI issues this query
to get the time update key of some user with identity
ID on time period Ti. SI runs the TimeKeyUpd
algorithm with input (PP,mtk, ID,Ti), and returns
the resulting TKID,Ti to AI .
- Signing query (m, ID,Ti).When AI issues a signing
query with a message m, the identity ID and time
period Ti, SI runs Sign algorithm and outputs a
signature σ to AI .
• Forgery. At last AI outputs a tuple (m∗, ID∗,T ∗i , σ ∗)
with the following two constraints:
1) AI does not issue any time key update query on
(ID∗,T ∗i ).
2) σ ∗ is not returned by a signning query on input
(m∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) issued by AI .
It is said that AI succeeds in attacking the scheme if
Ver(PP,m∗, σ ∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) = "Accept". AI ’s advantage
AdvAI (λ) is defined as
AdvAI (λ) = Pr[Ver(PP,m∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) = "Accept"].
The game between adversary AII and a challenger SII is
defined as follows.
Game 2: The Setup and Query phases are the same as in
Game I.
Forgery.At the end of theQuery phase,AII outputs a tuple
(m∗, ID∗,T ∗i , σ ∗) with the following two constraints:
1) AII does not issue any initial key extract query on input
ID∗.
2) σ ∗ is not returned by a signning query on input
(m∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) issued by AII .
It is said that AII succeeds in attacking the scheme if
Ver(PP,m∗, σ ∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) = "Accept". AII ’s advantage
AdvAII (λ) is defined as
AdvAII (λ) = Pr[Ver(PP,m∗, σ ∗, ID∗,T ∗i ) = "Accept"].
From the above games we have the following security
definition of a RIBS scheme.
Definition 1 (EUF-RID-CMA): A RIBS scheme with out-
sourced revocation is said to be existentially unforgeable
against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks if there
is no probabilistic polynomial time adversary that has a non-
negligible advantage in either Game I or Game II .
IV. PROPOSED RIBS SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed outsourced RIBS
scheme. The scheme is composed of the following five algo-
rithms, as defined in Section III-B.
• Setup(λ) : The KGC runs the algorithm as follows.
1) Choose two cyclic groups G and G1 with the same
prime order q. Let P be a generator of groupG, and
eˆ : G × G → G1 be a bilinear map. We compute
g = eˆ(P,P).
2) We randomly choose two secret values s, t ∈ Z∗q ,
where s is the master identity key and t is the maser
time key. Then, we compute Ppub = sP,Pt = tP.
Keep s secret and transform t to the CRS in a secure
way.
3) We select three hash functions as follows:
H1 : {0, 1}∗→ G,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗→ G,
h : {0, 1}∗ × G→ Z∗q .
4) We publish the system parameters
PP = (q,G,G1,P,Ppub,Pt ,H1,H2, h).
• InitKeyExt(PP, s, ID) : For a user with identity ID, the
KGC sets
QID = H1(ID), DID = sQID,
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and sends the initial identity key DID to the user through
a secure channel.
• TimeKeyUpd(PP, t, ID,Ti) : Upon receiving an update
request from a user ID at the time period Ti, the CRS
computes
QID,Ti = H2(ID,Ti), TID,Ti = tQID,Ti ,
and sends TID,Ti to the user.
• Sign(PP,m, ID,Ti,DID,TID,Ti ) : Given a message m
and time period Ti, a signer with identity ID produces
the signature for m using the identity key DID and time
update key TID,Ti as follows. We randomly choose r ∈
Z∗q , and compute:
α = gr ,
v = h(m, α),
U = rP+ v(DID + TID,Ti ).
The signature for the message m at the time period Ti is
σ = (U , α).
• Ver(PP,m, σ, ID,Ti) : On receiving a signature σ =
(U , α) on message m and time period Ti, the verifier
computes
v = h(m, α),
and verifies if
eˆ(U ,P) = αeˆ(QID,Ppub)veˆ(QID,Ti ,Pt )v.
holds. The verifier outputs "Accept" if it does, or
"Reject" if not.
We demonstrate the consistency of the scheme as follows:
eˆ(U ,P) = eˆ(rP+ v(DID + TID,Ti ),P)
= eˆ(rP,P)eˆ(DID,P)veˆ(TID,Ti ,P)v
= eˆ(P,P)r eˆ(sQID,P)veˆ(tQID,Ti ,P)v
= gr eˆ(QID, sP)veˆ(QID,Ti , tP)v
= αeˆ(QID,Ppub)veˆ(QID,Ti ,Pt )v.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the pro-
posed scheme in terms of the security model defined in
section III-B. We employ the forking lemma technique intro-
duced in [32].
Lemma 1: If there is a type I adversary who makes at
most qH1 , qH2 , qh, , qe, qu, qs queries to the hash functions
H1,H2, h, initial key extract oracle, time key update oracle
and signing oracle respectively and breaks the proposed RIBS
scheme with non-negligible probability I , then there exists
a probabilistic challenger who can solve the CDH problem
with advantage
′I ≥ (1−
1
q
)
1
qH2
I − qhq .
Proof: Suppose AI is a type I adversary who wins the
attack game with advantage I . We construct an algorithm
SI who uses AI as a subroutine to solve the CDH problem.
Suppose SI is given a CDH instance (P,Pa = aP,Pb = bP),
where P is a generator of an additive cyclic group G of order
q, and a, b is unknown to SI . To compute Pab = abP, SI
simulates a challenger for the adversary as follows.
• Setup. SI randomly chooses s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub =
sP,Pt = Pa and sends (P,Ppub,Pt ) to the adversary AI .
SI chooses an l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qH2} and maintains three
lists L1,L2 and L3 which are initially empty. SI answers
AI ’s queries as follows.
• Query.
– Hash query. We assume that AI has already queried
the corresponding hash oracles before it makes fur-
ther queries. SI answers three kinds of hash queries
as follows.
∗ H1-query. If AI issues aH1-query on identity ID,
SI first checks if there is an entry in the list L1.
If yes, SI returns that entry, else SI randomly
chooses x ∈ Z∗q and returns H1(ID) = xP and
adds (ID, x,H1(ID)) into the list L1.
∗ H2-query. Suppose that AI issues i-th H2-query
on identity IDi and time period Tj, SI first checks
if there is an entry in the list L2. If so, SI returns
that entry, else it randomly chooses y ∈ Z∗q and
sets
H2(IDi,Tj) =
{
yP i 6= l
yPb i = l
SI adds (IDi,Tj, y,H2(IDi,Tj)) into list L2 if i 6=
l, else it adds the entry (IDi,Tj ⊥,H2(IDi,Tj)),
and sets ID∗ = IDi and T ∗ = Tj.
∗ h-query. On receiving a h-query on input (m, α),
SI first checks if there is an entry in the list
L3. If there is, SI returns the entry, else it
returns a randomly chosen v ∈ Z∗q , and adds
(m, α, h(m, α)) into list L3.
– Initial key extract query. On receiving such a query
on identity ID, SI searches list L1 to find the entry
(ID, x,H1(ID)), and responds with DID = xPpub.
– Time key update query. If AI issues a query on IDi
and Tj, SI first checks if (IDi,Tj) = (ID∗,T ∗).
If not, SI searches the list L2 to find the entry
(IDi,Tj, y,H2(ID)), and responds with TIDi,Tj =
yPt , else SI sets TIDi,Tj =⊥.
– Signing query. If AI issues a signing query on
identity IDi, Tj and message m, SI searches the
list L1,L2, to find the corresponding H1(ID) and
H2(ID,Ti). SI then randomly chooses U ∈ G, v ∈
Z∗q and computes
α = eˆ(U ,P)eˆ(Ppub,H1(IDi))−veˆ(Pt ,H2(IDi,Tj))−v.
SI searches the list L3, if there is an entry
(m, α, h(m, α)) and h(m, α) 6= v, then SI aborts, else
SI returns the signature σ = (U , α) to AI . In this
case, σ is a valid signature.
• Forgery. Finally, the adversary AI outputs a signa-
ture σ ∗ = (U∗, α∗) on ID′, T ′, and message m∗.
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If (ID′,T ′) = (ID∗,T ∗) and Ver(PP,m∗, ID∗,T ∗) =
"Accept", then output σ ∗ = (U∗, α∗). Otherwise, the
output "fail" is issued.
Now we apply the forking lemma technique.
SI runs the above simulated game again with the same
random coins, but responds to hash queries issued by AI with
different random values. By the General Forking Lemma,
AI will output a different forgery σ ′ = (U ′, α′) on the
same message m∗, identity ID∗ and time period T ∗ with non-
negligible probability (the probability would be 1/9 for some
appropriate chosen parameters. A more in-depth description
is given in [32]. Here we assume that AI always outputs
another valid forgery without loss of generality). Since SI
runs the game with the same random tape, we have α∗ =
α′ = gr from some r ∈ Z∗q , while the underlying hash values
corresponding to the two forged signatures are different. We
assume that in the signature (U∗, α∗),
H1(ID∗) = x∗P, H2(ID∗,T ∗) = y∗Pb, h(m∗, α∗) = v∗.
While in the signature (U ′, α′),
H1(ID∗) = x ′P, H2(ID∗,T ∗) = y′Pb, h(m∗, α′) = v′.
Since the hash values are randomly chosen, so x∗ 6= x ′, y∗ 6=
y′ and v∗ 6= v′ with high probability.
On the other hand, since both (U∗, α∗) and (U ′, α′) are
valid signatures, we have
eˆ(U∗,P) = α∗eˆ(Ppub, x∗P)v∗ eˆ(Pt , y∗Pb)v∗ (1)
eˆ(U ′,P) = α′eˆ(Ppub, x ′P)v′ eˆ(Pt , y′Pb)v′ (2)
By dividing the above two equations, and the condition
α∗ = α′, we have
eˆ(U∗ − U ′,P) = eˆ(Ppub,P)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(Pt ,Pb)y∗v∗−y′v′
= eˆ(sP,P)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(Pa,Pb)y∗v∗−y′v′
= eˆ(P, sP)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(P,Pab)y∗v∗−y′v′ ,
then
eˆ(P,Pab)y
∗v∗−y′v′ = eˆ(P,U∗ − U ′)eˆ(P, sP)x ′v′−x∗v∗
= eˆ(P,U∗ − U ′)eˆ(P, (x ′v′ − x∗v∗)sP)
= eˆ(P, (U∗ − U ′)+ (x ′v′ − x∗v∗)sP)
So
eˆ(P,Pab) = eˆ(P, (U∗ − U ′)+ (x ′v′ − x∗v∗)sP)(y∗v∗−y′v′)−1
= eˆ(P, (y∗v∗ − y′v′)−1(U∗ − U ′
+ (x ′v′ − x∗v∗)sP))
From the above equation we obtain:
Pab = (y∗v∗ − y′v′)−1(U∗ − U ′ + (x ′v′ − x∗v∗)sP).
So we get the solution of the challenging CDH instance.
Now we analyze the probability that SI succeeds. In the
Setup and Query phase, the simulation is perfect except
the following two events happen. First, SI issues a query
(ID∗,T ∗) to H2 oracle, which has a probability of qH2/q.
Second, SI returns a signature (U , α) on (m, IDi,Tj) and
h(m, α) has already been in the list L3 and h(m, α) 6= v,
where v is randomly chosen by SI . This event occurs with
a probability of qh/q. If the simulation process is exe-
cuted smoothly, then in the Forgery phase, AI will output
a valid forgery (ID′,T ′,m∗, σ ∗) with an advantage of I .
Note that since H2 is a random oracle, the probability that
(ID′,T ′,m∗, σ ∗) is valid without any query of H2(ID′,T ′) is
1/q. So (ID′,T ′) has been asked to H2 oracle in the Query
Phase with a probability of 1 − 1q . Moreover, l is randomly
chosen from {1, 2, . . . , qH2}. Thus (ID′,T ′) = (ID∗,T ∗)
holds with a probability of (1− 1q ) 1qH2 . So the probability that
Ver(ID′,T ′,m∗, σ ∗) = accept and (ID′,T ′) = (ID∗,T ∗) is
(1− 1q ) 1qH2 I −
qh
q .
From the above analysis we can see that SI solves the CDH
problem with probability (1− 1q ) 1qH2 I −
qh
q .
Lemma 2: If there is a type II adversary who makes at
most qH1 , qH2 , qh, , qe, qu, qs queries to the hash functions
H1,H2, h, initial key extract oracle, time key update oracle
and signing oracle respectively and breaks the proposed RIBS
schemewith a non-negligible probability II , then there exists
a probabilistic challenger who can solve the CDH problem
with advantage
′II ≥ (1−
1
q
)
1
qH1
II − qhq .
Proof: Suppose AII is a type II adversary who wins the
attack game with advantage II . We construct an algorithm
SII , who uses AII as a subroutine to solve the CDH problem.
Suppose SII is given a CDH instance (P,Pa = aP,Pb = bP),
where P is a generator of an additive cyclic group G of order
q, and a, b is unknown to SII . To compute Pab = abP, SII
simulates a challenger for the adversary as follows.
• Setup. SII randomly choose t ∈ Z∗q , and sets Ppub =
Pa,Pt = tP and sends (P,Ppub,Pt ) to the adversary
AII . SII then randomly chooses l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qH1}. SII
maintains three lists L1,L2 and L3 which are initially
empty, and answers AII ’s queries as follows.
• Query.
– Hash query. We assume that the adversary has
already queried the corresponding hash oracles
before it makes further queries.
∗ H1-query. On receiving the i-th H1-query on
identity IDi, SII first checks if there is an entry in
the list L1. If there is, SII returns the entry, else
SII randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗q and sets
H1(IDi) =
{
xP i 6= l
xPb i = l
SII returns H1(IDi) to AII and adds (IDi, x,
H1(IDi)) into the list L1 if i 6= l, otherwise it adds
(IDi,⊥,H1(IDi)) into list L1 and set ID∗ = IDi.
∗ H2-query. On receiving a H2-query on IDi and
Tj, SII first checks if there is an entry in the
list L2. If yes, SII returns as the same, else
it randomly chooses y ∈ Z∗q and returns
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H2(IDi,Tj) = yP. SII then adds (IDi,Tj, y,
H2(IDi,Tj)) into list L2.
∗ h-query. On receiving a h-query on input (m, α),
SII first checks if there is an entry in the list
L3. If yes, SII returns as the same, otherwise it
returns a randomly chosen v ∈ Z∗q , and adds
(m, α, h(m, α)) into list L3.
– Initial key extract query. If AII issues such a query
on identity ID, SII first checks if ID = ID∗. If not,
SII searches list L1 to find the entry (ID, x,H1(ID)),
and responds with DID = xPpub, else SII returns
a ⊥.
– Time key update query. On receiving such a query
on IDi and Tj, SII searches the list L2 to find the
entry (IDi,Tj, y,H2(IDi,Tj)), and responds with
TIDi,Tj = yPt .
– Signing query. IfAII issues a signing query on ID, Ti
and message m, SII first searches the list L1,L2,L3
to find the corresponding H1(ID) and H2(ID,Ti).
SII then randomly chooses U ∈ G, v ∈ Z∗q and
computes
α = eˆ(U ,P)eˆ(Ppub,H1(ID))−veˆ(Pt ,H2(ID,Ti))−v.
SII searches the list L3, if there is an entry
(m, α, h(m, α)) and h(m, α) 6= v, then SII aborts,
else SII returns the signature σ = (U , α) to AII . In
this case, σ is a valid signature.
• Forgery. The adversary AII outputs a forgery σ ∗ =
(U∗, α∗) on identity ID′, time period T ′, and message
m∗. If ID′ = ID∗ and Ver(PP,m∗, ID′,T ′) = accept ,
SII outputs (U∗, α∗) as the forgery else it outputs ‘‘fail.’’
SII runs the simulated game twice with the same random
coins, but responds the hash queries with different random
values. By the General Forking Lemma, AII will output a
different forgery σ ′ = (U ′, α′) on the same identity ID∗, mes-
sage m∗ and time period T ∗i with non-negligible probability.
We have α∗ = α′ = gr , and assume that in the signature
(U∗, α∗),
H1(ID∗) = x∗Pb, H2(ID∗,T ∗i ) = y∗Pt , h(m∗, α∗) = v∗.
While in the signature (U ′, α′),
H1(ID∗) = x ′Pb, H2(ID∗,T ∗i ) = y′Pt , h(m∗, α∗) = v′.
Since the hash values are randomly chosen, so x∗ 6= x ′, y∗ 6=
y′ and v∗ 6= v′ with overwhelming probability.
On the other hand, since both (U∗, α∗) and (U ′, α′) are
valid signatures, we have
eˆ(U∗,P) = α∗eˆ(Ppub, x∗Pb)v∗ eˆ(Pt , y∗P)v∗ (3)
eˆ(U ′,P) = α′eˆ(Ppub, x ′Pb)v′ eˆ(Pt , y′P)v′ (4)
By dividing the above two equations, and the condition
α∗ = α′, we have
eˆ(U∗ − U ′,P) = eˆ(Ppub,Pb)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(Pt ,P)y∗v∗−y′v′
= eˆ(aP, bP)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(tP,P)y∗v∗−y′v′
= eˆ(P,Pab)x∗v∗−x ′v′ eˆ(P, tP)y∗v∗−y′v′ ,
TABLE 2. Notations of computation costs.
TABLE 3. Computation time for operations.
then
eˆ(P,Pab)x
∗v∗−x ′v′ = eˆ(P,U∗ − U ′)eˆ(P, tP)y′v′−y∗v∗
= eˆ(P,U∗ − U ′)eˆ(P, (y′v′ − y∗v∗)tP)
= eˆ(P, (U∗ − U ′)+ (y′v′ − y∗v∗)tP).
So
eˆ(P,Pab) = eˆ(P, (U∗ − U ′)
+ (y′v′ − y∗v∗)tP)(x∗v∗−x ′v′)−1
= eˆ(P, (x∗v∗ − x ′v′)−1((U∗ − U ′)
+ (y′v′ − y∗v∗)tP))
From the above equation we can see that
Pab = (x∗v∗ − x ′v′)−1((U∗ − U ′)+ (y′v′ − y∗v∗)tP).
The analysis of SII ’s advantage is just the same as SI ’s
advantage in the simulated Game I. We note that at the end
of simulated Game II, AII will output a valid signature on
identity ID∗ with a probability of (1− 1q ) 1qH1 II −
qh
q , which
is exactly the advantage that SII succeeds. This concludes the
proof.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we get the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 1: The proposed RIBS scheme with outsourced
revocation is existence unforgeable against adaptive chosen
identity and message attack under the CDH assumption.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the performance evaluation of the
proposed scheme, including computation and communication
costs. We choose the Ate pairing eˆ : G × G → GT
generated by a point on a super singular eppliptic curve
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TABLE 4. Comparisons of computation costs.
over a finite field E(Fp), where G,GT are groups of prime
order q. To ensure an appropriate security level, p and q
are large prime numbers with a length of 512 and 160 bits
respectively. Table 2 lists the notations used to describe
the computation costs of the operations used in the related
schemes.
Previous implementations have showed that compared
with the computation costs of time-consuming bilinear
pairing map, map-to-point hash, scalar multiplication and
modular exponentiation operations, the computation costs
of point addition, multiplication in GT and the ordinary
hash operations are trivial. Therefore, we only consider
TGeˆ,TGH ,TGm,Te when we evaluate the performance.
We evaluate the costs of the above basic operations using
MIRACL library [33] on the elastic compute service (ECS)
host provided by the Alibaba Cloud platform. The operating
system of the host is Ubutu 14.04 for 64 bit with an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 0 @ 2.30GHz, and equipped with
1GB RAM. Table 3 lists the computational time for related
operations on the host.
Since there is no other RIBS scheme with CRS based
on pairings and proven secure in the random oracle model,
we therefore compared the performance of our scheme with
some IBS schemes with bilinear pairings but without revo-
cation functionality, and we also compared the performance
of our scheme with two RIBS schemes that are secure in
the standard model. Table 4 lists the comparisons among
the schemes of Hess [12], Paterson [10], Tsai et al. [28],
Hung et al. [29] and ours in terms of computation costs
for the initial key extraction, time key update, signing and
verification.
There is no revocation in Hess’s and Paterson’s schemes,
but we can extend their schemes to be revocable by using
the framework we proposed in section III-A. Tsai and Hung
have included revocation functionality in their schemes, but
the schemes are designed in the standard model, which means
that the hash functions they used are much more inefficient
than those used in the random oracle model. In the com-
parisons, although we omit most of the computation costs
of specific, hash operations, the comparison results are still
meaningful and referential. We also take into account the
operations which can be precomputed in all the schemes to
achieve the best performance from them.
For the computation cost in the initial key extraction,
Hess’s scheme requires TGm + TGH (7.071ms), same as
Paterson’s and our scheme. Tsai’s and Hung’s schemes both
require 3TGm (5.91ms). As for the time key update, our
scheme requires TGm + TGH (7.071ms). Tsai’s and Hung’s
schemes require 3TGm (5.91ms). There is no such oper-
ations in Hess’s and Paterson’s scheme, but if we extend
their schemes using the technique we propose, the compu-
tation costs of time key update of their schemes will be
same as ours, namely, TGm + TGH (7.071). As for the
signing process, Hess’s scheme requires TGeˆ + 2TGm +
Te (9.546ms). Paterson’s scheme requires 3TGm (5.91ms).
Tsai’s scheme requires 4TGm (7.88ms). Hung’s scheme
requires 5TGm (9.85ms) while our scheme only requires
2TGm (3.94ms). For the verification process, although there
are three bilinear maps that need to be evaluated for each sig-
nature in our scheme, but some of them can be precomputed.
Hess’s scheme requires 2TGeˆ + Te (10.881ms). Paterson’sS
scheme requires 2TGeˆ + 2Te (11.212ms). Tsai’s scheme
requires 4TGeˆ(21.1ms). Hung’s scheme requires 4TGeˆ + Te
(21.431ms). Our scheme requires TGeˆ + 2Te (5.937ms).
Although our scheme seems a little more time consuming
than Tsai’s and Hung’s schemes in the initial key extraction
and time key update process, it is worth pointing out that there
are several point addition brevity. Moreover, the initial key
extraction and time key update process would not be executed
frequently, so there is impact on the overall performance. As
for the signing and verification process, our scheme outper-
forms the other schemes.
Table 5 presents the comparisons of communication costs
in terms of the size of initial identity key, time update key and
signature. Let |G| denote the size of each element in group
G. If G is a elliptic curve on finite field Fp, where p is a
512 bit prime number, then |G| denotes the size of a point
inG, which is 1024 bits. |q| denotes the bit length of q, which
is, for example, 160 bits to achieve an appropriate security
level. The initial identity key has a length of |G| (1024 bits)
in schemes of Hess, Paterson and ours, and has a length of
2|G| (2048 bits) in the schemes of Tsai et al. and Hung et al..
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TABLE 5. Comparison of communication costs.
The time update key has the same length as the initial identity
key in each scheme except for Hess’s and Paterson’s schemes.
For the size of the signature, Hess’s scheme has a length of
|G|+|q| (1184 bits), which is same as ours. Paterson’s scheme
has a length of 2|G| (2048 bits). Both Tsai’s and Hung’s
schemes has a length of 4|G| (4096 bits). We observe that the
communication costs of Hess’s scheme and ours are lower
than the other schemes. We also present the security model
and revocability of the target schemes in table 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient RIBS scheme with CRS
based on bilinear pairings. To eliminate the computation and
communication costs of the KGC, revocation functionality
is outsourced to a cloud revocation server. We present the
framework of the outsourced revocation RIBS scheme and
formalize the security model. Our scheme is proven to be
secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen mes-
sages and identity attacks in the random oracle model. The
performance comparisons show that our scheme has lower
computation costs and shorter signature size than previously
proposed RIBS schemes thereby demonstrating its suitability
for resource-constrained resources such as wireless sensor
networks.
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